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The Cost of Trend Chasing and  
The Illusion of Momentum Profits 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 There is a large and growing literature documenting the relation between ex ante 
observable variables and stock returns.  Importantly, much of the evidence on the relation between 
returns and observable variables like market capitalization, the ratio of price/book, and prior price 
change has been portrayed in the context of returns to simulated portfolio strategies.  Often missing 
in these analyses is the distinction between realizable returns (i.e., the returns portfolio managers 
can realistically achieve in practice) and returns to simulated strategies.  There is ample evidence 
that size and value strategies can be successfully implemented in practice; that is not the case for 
momentum strategies.  This paper documents the costs of implementing actual momentum 
strategies.  I examine the trade behavior, and the costs of those trades, for three distinct investor 
styles (momentum, fundamental/value, and diversified/index) for 33 institutional investment 
managers executing trades in the U.S. and 36 other equity markets worldwide in both developed 
and emerging economies.  The results show: (1) that momentum traders do indeed condition their 
trades on prior price movements; and (2) that costs for trades that are made conditional on prior 
market returns are significantly greater than for unconditional costs, especially for momentum 
traders.  The evidence that we report on the actual costs of momentum-based trades indicates that 
the returns reported in previous studies of simulated momentum strategies are not sufficient to 
cover the costs of implementing those strategies. 
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The Cost of Trend Chasing and  
The Illusion of Momentum Profits 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a large and growing literature documenting the relation between stock returns and 
observable variables like market capitalization, the ratio of price to book, and prior price changes.  
Importantly, much of the evidence on this relation has been portrayed in the context of returns to 
simulated portfolio strategies.  Often missing in the analyses of simulated portfolio strategies is the 
distinction between simulated “paper” returns and realizable returns (investment strategy returns 
net of the costs of implementing the strategy).  There is ample evidence that size and value 
strategies can be successfully implemented in practice;1 that is not obviously the case for 
momentum strategies. The paper profits generated by simulated momentum strategies appear, to 
many researchers, to be inconsistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.2  However, to violate 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis abnormal returns must exceed the costs of implementing the 
strategy designed to generate them.    
This paper contributes to the growing literature on momentum in stock prices by 
documenting the costs of implementing actual momentum strategies, and showing that costs for 
trades that are made conditional on past market movements are significantly greater than 
unconditional costs.  I estimate the implementation costs of momentum strategies directly from the 
trades of momentum-oriented institutional investors over two different twelve-month periods 
during 1997-2000.  The data include trades not only for momentum managers but also for value 
and passive managers, and cover more than 1.6 million trades worth $1.1 trillion in the U.S. and 36 
other equity markets worldwide in both developed and emerging economies.  As such, they permit 
a more precise focus on the issues than previously possible.   
The paper makes three contributions.  First, I investigate whether trend chasing is evident 
in the trading behavior of the three investment styles in the data. The results show that the 
momentum traders are indeed conditioning their trades on prior price movements.  Estimation of 
                                                 
1 For example, Dimensional Fund Advisors and LSV Asset Management have developed successful mutual funds 
based on academic research documenting size and value effects. 
2 The evidence has prompted Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) to claim that “the momentum effect represents perhaps 
the strongest evidence against the Efficient Market Hypothesis.”  And Johnson (2002, JF) writes “There would 
appear to be few more flagrant affronts to the idea of rational, efficient markets than the existence of large excess 
returns to simple momentum strategies in the stock market.” 
 2
logit models indicate that buys are more likely to be made in rising markets and sells are more 
likely in falling markets for the momentum traders in my sample.  This is in contrast to the 
index/diversified managers in the sample whose buys and sells are unrelated to recent prior price 
movements, and for the value managers whose buys (sells) are more likely to follow recent price 
declines (price increases).  The findings show clear evidence of trend chasing (positive feedback 
trading) by the momentum traders.  
Second, I ask whether this trade behavior contributes in an important way to the costs of 
implementing the strategies.  To answer the question, I separately examine the trade costs of the 
momentum, value and diversified traders – each of whom have different motives for trading – 
conditional on past market returns to assess how the market environment in which a trade is made 
affects the cost of execution (and, ultimately, the profitability of the strategy).  In previous 
research, two different approaches have been used to gauge the profitability of momentum 
strategies: (1) unconditional average cost estimates from prior research are compared to the profits 
generated by the simulated momentum strategies (e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2002), Grundy 
and Martin (2001)); (2) inferences regarding price impacts are drawn from statistical models using 
transactions-level prices – where the models are simulated without regard to the potential influence 
on price impacts of either the motivation for trade or the market environment in which the trade 
takes place – and compared with the profitability of simulated momentum strategies (e.g., 
Korajczyk and Sadka (2002), Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2003)).  Neither of these approaches 
accounts for the fact that trade costs are a function of both investment style (see, e.g., Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997)) and the market conditions (e.g., a rising or a 
falling market) that prevail when the trade is executed.  In addition, because traders often break up 
large trades into smaller individual trades, analysis of the price impacts of individual trades (as is 
necessary when using transactions-level information like that in the TAQ data base) under-
estimates the price impact associated with the total desired order quantity.   The price impacts 
reported here account for all of these important factors by employing the total trade order as the 
unit of observation and conditioning on trade difficulty (trade size, market cap of the stock), the 
investment style of the manager, and the direction of the market in which the stock trades.   
Conditioning on past market returns is important because momentum traders are buying 
(selling) when the stock price is rising (falling) and the market for the stock has excess buyers 
(sellers).  Under such conditions, their trade costs (for purchases of stocks on a rising trajectory, for 
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example) are expected to be higher than the unconditional average due to a combination of: (1) 
increased demand for liquidity on the momentum trader’s side of the market due to the existence of 
other like-minded traders; and/or (2) reduced supply of liquidity due to fewer sellers/owners of 
recently appreciated stocks who don’t wish to realize their capital gains.  As it turns out, market 
environment is an important determinant of price impact.  For example, one-way average price 
impacts for momentum traders in the U.S. are 1.21% when buying stocks in a rising market and 
1.37% when selling in a falling market.  Adding opportunity costs (of not being able to execute at 
the price prevailing at the time of the decision to trade) and commissions and other explicit costs of 
transacting inflates these costs to 1.82% for buys in rising markets and 1.96% for sells in falling 
markets.  The trade costs reported here represent a clearer picture of the costs of implementing 
momentum strategies than previously reported in the literature and set a very high hurdle rate for 
the profits implied by the simulated strategies.  The reality inevitably falls short of the illusion. 
  Finally, in addition to documenting momentum trade behavior and its costs in a broad 
cross section of U.S. and international markets, the results also represent the first detailed analysis 
of the relative costs of trading equities internationally. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the previous evidence on momentum 
profits and section 3 describes the trade data used here to measure price impacts.  Section 4 
provides an overview of the price impacts for momentum, value and diversified traders in U.S., 
developed, and emerging stock markets.  Section 5 reports the evidence on whether institutional 
trades are conditioned on prior market movements, and section 6 analyzes the conditional price 
impacts of momentum trades.  Section 7 reports on total trade costs comprising price impacts, 
opportunity costs and commissions, and discusses the implications of the magnitude of these costs 
for the profitability of momentum strategies.  Section 8 provides some evidence on the short-term 
performance of the momentum traders in my sample, and section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Prior Evidence on the Profitability of Simulated Momentum Strategies 
The research on momentum is in general agreement that intermediate horizon (three to twelve 
month) stock returns exhibit significant persistence.  There is little consensus, however, on the 
reason for persistence in returns.  Some argue that its prevalence over long periods is evidence that 
the abnormal returns associated with momentum strategies are compensation for some unidentified 
source of non-diversifiable risk (Carhart (1997), Fama and French (1996)).  Other research 
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suggests that the price momentum is related to trading in response to earnings-related news (Boni 
and Womack (2003), Burch and Swaminathan (2002)). 
Still others argue that momentum in stock prices is simply the manifestation of the trade 
behavior of market participants who condition trades on prior price movements (e.g., positive 
feedback strategies), behavior that violates the usual norms of rationality necessary for equilibrium 
asset pricing.  Numerous investigators have attempted to model this behavior within well-
established psychological paradigms, attributing the investor trading patterns to either under-
reaction (Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (1998), Grinblatt and Han (2002))3 or over-reaction 
(Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999)) to the perceived 
information in prior price movements.  Although the evidence is mixed regarding the form of the 
irrational behavior, this strand of research agrees that the resulting abnormal momentum profits 
represent a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. (See footnote 2.) 
 
2.1 The Profitability of Simulated Momentum Strategies 
Much of the previous research documents profits to momentum strategies simulated with 
CRSP data for U.S. stocks.  This section briefly characterizes the magnitude of the simulated 
profits by surveying the original results from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and three additional 
recent studies. We also provide a brief description of the experimental strategies used to generate 
the profits. 
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) form equal-weighted portfolios based on deciles of a ranking 
of all NYSE and AMEX stocks based on the prior j-month return where j is 3, 6, 9 or 12.  Their 
analysis covers the period 1965 to 1989.  The strategy buys decile 10 stocks (winners) and shorts 
decile 1 stocks (losers), and the profit is the net return to the long-short position, as measured over 
holding periods of 3, 6, 9 or 12 months.  As is common to all the studies discussed below, the 
portfolio holding period begins one month after the creation of the portfolio to avoid 
microstructure-related effects in returns.  The resulting monthly profits range from 0.69% to 
1.49%.  Note that although the list of component stocks in a portfolio does not change during the 
holding period, the equal weighting of the portfolios implicitly imposes a large amount of trading 
                                                 
3 The explanation for momentum profits in Grinblatt and Han, related to the “disposition effect” in which investors 
hold losing stocks too long and sell winning stocks too quickly, rests on capital gains and, therefore, tax 
considerations that apply only to taxable (individual) investors.  The evidence presented in this paper indicates that a 
non-trivial portion of the momentum in stock prices is due to the trades of (tax-exempt) institution investors. 
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to the strategy as portfolios are rebalanced to equal weights every month.  Profits are not adjusted 
for the costs of trading and portfolio turnover implicit in the strategy. 
 Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2002) also analyze a strategy that buys decile 10 stocks 
(winners) and shorts decile 1 stocks (losers).  Their analysis covers the period 1966 to 1995 and 
includes NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks..  They construct their momentum deciles by ranking 
stocks based on predicted returns from a multivariate regression employing a variety of lagged 
returns, measured over intervals of varying lengths, as independent variables (see their table 2).  
They construct value-weighted portfolios based on those decile breakpoints, and the profit is 
defined as the difference in monthly return between the top and bottom deciles.  Portfolio positions 
are held for one month.  Although their analysis includes a number of strategies resulting from 
several different combinations of the independent variables used in the multivariate regression, a 
representative strategy yields a monthly profit of 1.11%.  Grinblatt and Moskowitz estimate 
portfolio turnover implied by this strategy to be 102.6% (monthly), and conclude that trade costs in 
the neighborhood of 1.0% would be sufficient to eliminate the profitability of the strategy.4  
Relying on previously published studies of trading costs (they do not measure trade costs in their 
paper) they conclude that the returns to their momentum strategy exceed the costs of 
implementation. 
 Grundy and Martin (2001) form equal-weighted portfolios based on deciles of a ranking of 
all NYSE and AMEX stocks based on the prior 6-month return.  Their analysis covers the period 
1926 to 1995.  The strategy buys decile 10 stocks (winners) and shorts decile 1 stocks (losers), and 
the profit is the net return to the long-short position measured over a holding period of one month.  
Grundy and Martin report strategy profits of 0.44% per month, and “risk-adjusted” profits of 
1.34% per month in which the strategy’s dynamic exposure to size and market factors is hedged 
out.  Given the turnover associated with the strategy, they conclude that round-trip trade costs of 
1.5% would render the strategy profits statistically insignificant. 
 Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) form equal-weighted portfolios using a ranking of all NYSE 
and AMEX stocks based on the prior 6-month return.  Their analysis covers the period 1980 to 
1996.  The strategy buys the top third of the stocks (winners) and shorts the bottom third (losers), 
and the profit is the net return to the long-short position measured over a holding period of six 
months.  The resulting monthly profit from the strategy is 0.52%.  The same caveat mentioned with 
                                                 
4 Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2002) report monthly turnover of 38.86% on the long and 63.75% on the short side of 
the strategy.  This translates to about 450% annually for the long side and 750% on the short side.  
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regard to Jegadeesh and Titman about equal-weighted portfolios also applies here.  Profits are not 
adjusted for the costs of trading and portfolio turnover implicit in the strategy. 
To provide some perspective, Table 1 reports momentum strategy profits as a function of 
portfolio turnover and total trade costs.  The values across a particular row represent net profits 
associated with a specific level of monthly turnover while varying the level of total trade costs 
(price impact plus commission). Similarly, the values in a particular column represent net profits 
associated with a particular level of total trade cost while varying the level of monthly turnover.  
The values in the table are based on monthly momentum profits reported in Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (2002) (GM) of 111 basis points, before adjustment for trade costs.  (Although the 
table could be based on any unadjusted profit value, I chose the 111 basis points associated with 
the GM strategy because they describe it as a relatively conservative strategy that requires less 
trading/turnover than other simulated strategies.)  Each value is defined as monthly profit (i.e., 111 
basis points) minus [(monthly turnover in percent)*(trade costs in basis points)].  Monthly turnover 
represents roundtrip monthly turnover - for example, if during the month a portfolio manager sells 
50% of the value of the positions in her portfolio, then her total trading volume during the month 
will be 100% of the value of her portfolio: 50% for the securities she sold and 50% for the assets 
bought to replace the sold positions.  (Typically, turnover is stated on a one-way, as opposed to 
roundtrip, basis;  i.e., in this case turnover would be reported as 50%.)  Positive profits are in 
italics, losses are in bold.  One could trace the curve that separates the regions of profit and loss 
and, thereby, identify breakeven levels of trade cost – turnover combinations.  For example, the 
strategy reported in GM has a monthly (roundtrip) turnover of 103%.  If one-way total trade costs 
associated with that strategy were 1.05% or less, the strategy would yield positive monthly profits.  
It is clear from the table that profitability requires a combination of low turnover and/or low costs, 
characteristic that are not typical for momentum strategies. 
The question is whether the breakeven estimates of total trade costs reported earlier for the 
simulated momentum strategies are lower than the implementation costs that would be realized by 
actual momentum traders.  Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Edwards and Wagner (1993), Keim and 
Madhavan (1997, 1998) and others have shown that trade costs of institutional investors vary 
significantly: (1) across stocks of different market capitalization and share price; (2) across 
different investing and trading styles; and (3) by quantity of shares traded.  It is the case in the 
empirically simulated momentum strategies that the highest concentration of trading takes place in 
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stocks that are the most difficult and expensive to trade – smaller cap and lower price stocks (see 
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2003)).  Keim and Madhavan (1998, table 2) report average one-way 
total trade costs of 1.78% (2.85%) for buys and 2.03% (2.91%) for sells for the smallest cap 
quintile of NYSE-AMEX (Nasdaq) stocks for the 1991-93 period, a trading period that lies in the 
sample periods of the studies referenced above.  Further, Keim and Madhavan (1997) show that 
trade costs for momentum traders in small-cap stocks are higher than for other types of traders, 
holding other things constant.  Trade costs of this magnitude, and in combination with the high 
turnover rates evident in the simulated strategies (e.g., 103% for the conservative strategy in 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz), clearly offset the simulated profits (c.f. table 1). 
 In recent papers, Korajczyk and Sadka (2002) and Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2003) 
develop statistical models of price impacts to gauge the profitability of simulated momentum 
strategies.  For example, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou use a variety of models to extract information 
about (unconditional) costs from transaction-level prices in the TAQ data.  Using the resulting 
security-level cost estimates to calibrate the profitability of simulated momentum strategies from 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) (i.e., if the strategy is trading 
small cap stocks, the simulation adjusts for the costs of trading small cap stocks), they argue that 
the strategies are not profitable. 
There are several shortcomings to the analysis of price impacts in these papers.  First, they 
don’t account for the fact that traders often break up a desired order quantity into smaller trades in 
an attempt to soften the price impact.  Thus, by measuring the price impact associated with an 
individual trade they are providing only a lower bound for the actual price impact associated with 
the total order quantity.  In addition, these papers account for neither the investment style that 
motivates the trade nor the market environment in which the trade takes place.  Momentum 
strategies, by their very nature, buy stocks that are rising and sell (or short sell) stocks that are 
dropping.  In effect, the momentum trader desires to buy shares during periods of excess demand 
and sell during periods of excess supply.5  Thus, to accurately measure the costs of implementing a 
momentum strategy one has to condition not only on the fact that such trades desire great 
immediacy in typically less liquid (more expensive) stocks, but also on the fact that momentum 
traders wish to trade on the side of the market where there is a reduced supply of liquidity (e.g., 
                                                 
5 Along these same lines, Kavajecz and Odders-White argue that the trading implicit in technical trading rules (e.g., 
trading related to “support” and “resistance” levels and to moving average rules) is related to changes in liquidity in 
the limit order book. 
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buying when there is a relative increase in the supply of buyers and a relative decrease in the 
supply of sellers).  In such environments, the trading associated with momentum strategies exerts 
pressure on prices (price impact) that will certainly be greater than the price impact implicit in 
unconditional costs. 
 
3. Data 
The data used in this study contain information on the equity transactions of 33 institutions in the 
U.S. and 36 other equity markets worldwide during two different time periods – April 1996 to 
March 1997, and the calendar year 2000.   The data were provided by the Plexus Group and are 
similar to those previously used in Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) (for the period Jan 1991 to 
Mar 1993), Barber and Odean (2002) (Jan 1993 to Mar 1996), and Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2001) (Oct 1994 to June 1996).  The main differences from those used in the earlier papers are 
that the data used here are from a more recent time period and include international stock 
transactions (the Plexus data in the previous papers contained only U.S. stock trades.)   
 The data identify key characteristics – price, number of shares traded, and date of trade – of 
the individual trades that comprise an expressed intention to buy or sell. Thus, individual trade 
prices can be aggregated to a volume-weighted price associated with the total desired order 
quantity.  As such, the unit of observation for the analysis in this paper is the trade order, which is 
composed of one or (typically) more transactions.  To be more specific, for each order the data 
include the following information:   
 
(i) the identity of the stock to be traded and the date when the trading decision was made; 
(ii) an indication as to whether the trade is a buy or a sell;  
(iii) the closing stock prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) for the fifteen trade days before the 
decision to trade is made, and for fifteen trade days after the order is completed;  
(iv) the dates and the individual components of the order released to the broker;  
(v) the volume-weighted average trade price, number of shares traded, and date(s) associated with 
the trade(s) executed by the broker within a specific order; and  
(vi) commissions, stamp duties, and other explicit trade fees.   
 
The database contains almost 607,000 orders (more than 1.6 million individual trades) across 37 
international equity markets with a total trade value of $1.1 trillion. 
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 Importantly, for our purposes, the data indicate the institution's investment strategy or style 
and, thereby, provide information regarding the motivation for the trade.  Plexus identifies three 
types of institutional investment strategies among the traders represented in the data (the identities 
of the traders are not revealed).  Momentum traders employ a strategy that is based primarily on 
capturing short-term price movements.  The investment strategy associated with the 
Value/Fundamental traders is based on assessment of fundamental value with a decidedly longer-
term perspective.  Index/Diversified traders seek to mimic the returns of a particular stock index or 
passive strategy.  Thus, the underlying investment strategy dictates the trading strategy and, 
thereby, motivates the classification used by Plexus.  The above characteristics of the data – total 
desired trade quantity and trade style – are critical for purposes of measuring and analyzing the 
effects of price impact on the profitability of trading strategies.   
 
4. The Relative Price Impacts of Trading Strategies: A First Look 
This section provides a first look at the level of price impacts for the three types of traders included 
in the sample.  In addition to providing summary statistics separately for each of the trader types, I 
also separate the sample into three market categories:  U.S. markets; Developed Markets excluding 
the U.S.; and Emerging Markets.  The countries within each category are listed in the Appendix.  
Finally, because the data contain two twelve-month sample periods that are separated by 33 
months, and represent two very distinct market environments, I also report results separately for 
the two time periods – April 1996 to March 1997 (96-97) and January 2000 to December 2000 
(2000).  The 96-97 period was characterized by generally positive returns in most of the markets 
contained in the sample.  For example, for the March 1996-April 1997 period, the average monthly 
returns for the value-weighted CRSP Index, the EAFE Index and the IFC Emerging Market Index 
are 1.27%, 0.17% and 0.96% respectively.  In contrast, world equity markets were generally down 
during the calendar year 2000 – the average monthly returns for the same three indexes for 2000 
are -0.86%, -1.17% and -3.02% respectively.6  As described in the next subsection, the analysis in 
this paper abstracts from the overall market environment by subtracting the local market returns 
from the price impacts associated with individual institutional trades. 
 
                                                 
6 These two time periods also reflect the change in minimum tick size in U.S. markets from eighths (96-97) to 
pennies (2000).  Although such a change in the minimum tick size has clear implications for the costs of retail trades 
that occur at bid or ask prices, the effect on institutional trade costs (and, particularly, price impacts) in U.S. markets 
is less clear.  See Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Jones and Lipson (2001) and Werner (2002) for discussion and 
evidence.  
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4.1 Definition of Price Impact 
 The unit of observation here is an order, which is an aggregated expression of the trader’s 
desired quantity of shares to be traded.  Each order is composed of one or more individual trades.  
For a buyer-initiated order, the price impact is given by the ratio of the volume-weighted average 
price of the component trades in the order to the closing price on the day before trading of the order 
is initiated, less one.  The total price impact for a seller-initiated trade is measured as the negative 
value of this quantity. Finally, market-adjusted price impact is computed by deducting the local 
market return (measured over the trading interval) from the total price impact.  The analysis in this 
paper, spanning numerous international stock exchanges, argues for the reporting of price impacts 
net of the local market return.  Differences in market returns across countries (and across 
subperiods) produce additional variation in price impacts, when computed inclusive of the local 
market returns, that is unrelated to the institutions’ trade behavior specific to the individual stock.  
Thus, deducting the local market return from the stock price movement during the trade interval 
isolates variation in idiosyncratic price movements specific to the institution’s trades in those 
shares. 
 
4.2 Variation in (Unconditional) Price Impacts across Time Periods 
Table 2 reports means and standard errors for price impacts adjusted for local market returns.  The 
table is divided into three panels, moving from left to right, corresponding to the trades of 
Diversified, Value, and Momentum institutions respectively.  The table is further divided, from top 
to bottom, into four additional panels corresponding to U.S. equity market trades, trades in 
developed markets excluding the U.S., emerging equity market trades, and market impacts 
averaged over all the markets in the data.  Within each of the sub panels, mean price impacts are 
reported separately for the 96-97 and 2000 time periods.   
 Comparing the local-market-adjusted price impacts across time periods, holding trader 
style and market categories constant, the results in Table 2 do not reveal any clear-cut patterns in 
price impacts.  For example, when averaged over all market categories (panel D), price impacts for 
buys of the Diversified and Value traders are larger in the 2000 period than in the 96-97 period.  
However, the price impacts for the sells of the Value and Diversified traders do not exhibit 
systematic differences across the two time periods – the 2000 sell impacts are higher (lower) than 
the 96-97 price impacts for the Diversified (Value) traders.  In contrast, both the buy and the sell 
average price impacts for the Momentum traders, when averaged over all markets, are larger in the 
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96-97 period than in the 2000 period.  However, this pattern for the momentum trades does not 
hold across all market categories.  Because price impacts across time periods do not display 
consistent patterns in Table 2, and because the results of tests in the following subsections are 
similar when estimated separately in the two subperiods, the analysis in subsequent sections pools 
the results from the two periods. 
 One final point regarding subperiod differences: some variation in the (unconditional) 
average price impacts across sample periods may occur because of differences in trade difficulty 
(i.e., small-cap vs. large-cap stocks, large trades vs. small trades, etc.) across the sample periods.  
Section 6 estimates price impact models in which appropriate controls are applied for factors 
relating to trade difficulty, so those influences will be accounted for explicitly.7   
 
4.3 Variation in (Unconditional) Price Impacts across Market Categories 
Moving from top to bottom in table 2, the separate panels report price impacts for market 
categories that are roughly decreasing in liquidity: U.S.; Developed Markets excluding the U.S.; 
and Emerging Markets.  The general impression from the table is that market-adjusted price 
impacts for buys are increasing with decreasing market liquidity, other things equal.  For example, 
average price impacts for trades executed by the diversified and value traders tend to be the highest 
in emerging market stocks (buy impacts range from 0.52% to 1.15%) and are often two to four 
times the average for their trades in the U.S. markets.  The price impacts of the buys of momentum 
traders deviate from this pattern.  While the mean price impacts for trades in developed markets 
(excluding U.S.) are lower than the mean impacts for emerging market trades for the momentum 
traders, the average price impacts for the U.S. momentum trades are higher than for trades in 
emerging markets.  In contrast, price impacts for sells by diversified, value and momentum traders 
in U.S. stocks tend to be larger than price impacts for sells in (non-U.S.) developed markets and 
emerging markets.  However, differences in trade difficulty and manager ability – which are not 
accounted for in these unconditional price impacts – may well contribute to these differences. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Differences in mean price impacts across the two time periods might also reflect differences in the composition of 
the traders represented in the sample in the two periods, and/or differences in the quantity of trading by the same 
traders in the two subperiods.  That is, different managers might reflect different skill levels, and those different skill 
levels might translate into significant differences in price impacts (Keim and Madhavan (1997)). 
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4.4 Variation in (Unconditional) Price Impacts across Trader Types 
Inspection of price impacts across trader types in Table 2 clearly shows (as in Keim and Madhavan 
(1997)) that Momentum traders have higher average price impacts than Value and Diversified 
traders.  For example, in the bottom panel for all markets, the mean price impact for buys for the 
Momentum traders in 96-97 (0.91%) is about three times larger than the corresponding mean price 
impacts for the Diversified (0.36%) and the Value traders (0.24%).  In the 2000 subperiod the 
mean price impact of 0.64% for the Momentum trader buys is larger (though not by much) than the 
mean for the Diversified traders (0.60%) and the Value traders (0.57%).  The difference in mean 
price impacts for sells between the Momentum traders and the other two trader types is even larger 
– ranging from two to four times larger – in both subperiods. 
 
4.4.1 Motivation for Trade and Trader Behavior 
 It is interesting that the significant differential in price impact between the momentum 
traders and the other traders is more pronounced for the sells than for the buys.  This is related to 
asymmetries (or lack thereof) in the kinds of information motivating trade.  Previous research finds 
that buys are more expensive than sells (Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Keim and Madhavan 
(1997)) and that traders are more patient (e.g., take longer to get into a position, break large trades 
into smaller pieces, use less aggressive orders, etc.) when buying than when selling (Keim and 
Madhavan (1995)).  Keim and Madhavan (1997) argue that this difference between buys and sells 
is due to asymmetries in the informational motives between buying and selling – there is a greater 
likelihood that buys are informationally motivated than sells because “there are many possibly 
non-informational motives for selling, but there are fewer plausible liquidity motives for buying.”  
This previously-observed difference in price impacts between buys and sells is evident for both the 
Diversified and the Value traders in table 2, in both subperiods.   
 In contrast, momentum traders are conditioning both their buys and sells on the same kind 
of information – past price behavior – and, therefore, their buying and selling behavior and, 
consequently, the price impacts associated with that behavior are more symmetric.  This is evident 
in the approximate equivalence of momentum price impacts for buys and sells in table 2 for trades 
executed in the U.S. markets, in other developed markets, and in emerging markets.   
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5. Are Institutional Trades Conditioned on Prior Price Movements? 
That the trade behavior of momentum institutions is linked to past price patterns distinguishes them 
from other traders whose strategies are more flexible and can be modified in response to changing 
market conditions.  This section documents the relation between momentum trade behavior and 
market conditions by examining the pre-trade price behavior of the institutional trades in my 
sample.  Specifically, I examine the pre-trade price behavior for three weeks (15 trade days) before 
the day of the first trade in an order.  I subtract the local market return from the individual stock 
return to arrive at a market-adjusted or excess price change for the three weeks prior to the trade – I 
call this PriorXRet.  The results for the pre-trade price patterns are reported in Table 3 for the 
combined 96-97 and 2000 time periods.8 
 The first two columns of Table 3 report average values of PriorXRet separately for buyer- 
and for seller-initiated trades.  Note that these are averages of 15-day price changes and not 
average daily price changes within the 15-day window.  Averaged over the entire sample (top 
row), PriorXRet is 0.83% before buy trades and 0.66% before sell trades.  The third column reports 
a t-test of the difference between the two means to assess whether the idiosyncratic trading 
environment preceding buys differs from that for sells. Averaged over all institutions and markets, 
PriorXRet for both buy and sell trades is positive (but remember that we’ve removed the overall 
market return from these means) but the t-value of 6.21 indicates that excess price changes 
preceding buys are significantly larger than those preceding sells.   
 Of course, more interesting is the potential difference in the pre-trade market-adjusted price 
behavior across the different institutions with their correspondingly different motivations for 
trading.  Thus, the remaining panels in Table 3 report mean values for PriorXRet separately for the 
diversified, value and momentum managers.  Within each panel, I further separate the results by 
the market category within which the trade took place.  The disaggregation by trade style reveals 
an interesting pattern of prior excess price changes.  First, for the diversified/index institutions, 
whose trade are motivated more for liquidity and/or portfolio rebalancing consideration, the 
expectation is that their trades will not be predicated on pre-trade price behavior.  The results 
confirm this prediction: when measured across all markets, the t-test of the difference in mean 
PriorXRet between buys and sells is -1.42 indicating no significant difference.  The results across 
                                                 
8 As for all the remaining tables in the paper, I have also computed results separately for the 96-97 and 2000 periods.  
In all cases, the results across subperiods are not materially different so I report only aggregated results in the paper.  
Subperiod results are available on request. 
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markets tells essentially the same story: the t-value is insignificant for U.S. trades (1.29) and 
significant but with different signs for the other developed markets (t = -3.37) and emerging 
markets (t = 2.20).   
 Second, the typical perception of a value or fundamentals-based trader is that she buys 
stocks whose prices are “low relative to fundamentals” (e.g., low Price to Book ratio) and sells 
when prices are high relative to the fundamentals.  Although such trades are not explicitly 
conditioned on prior price movement, the buying and selling motives just described are indeed 
consistent with buying after prices have fallen and selling after prices have risen if “fundamentals” 
(e.g., Book Value) evolve more slowly over time than do prices.  The pattern in pre-trade market-
adjusted price movements for the Value managers in the sample is consistent with this prediction.  
Averaged over all markets, the mean PriorXRet of 0.17% for buys is significantly smaller than the 
mean of 0.94% for sells (t = -17.00).  This pattern is repeated for trades in both the U.S. exchanges 
(t = -10.99), where the Value managers are indeed buying after (market-adjusted) price declines 
and selling after price increases, and in the other developed markets excluding the U.S.  
(t = -14.49).  For trades in emerging market exchanges, the difference in PriorXRet between buys 
and sells is also significant for the value managers. 
 Finally, the objective of the momentum trader is to capture (short-term) persistence in 
return.  As such, the momentum trader is explicitly conditioning her trades on prior price 
movements – buying stocks that are on an upward trajectory and selling (or shorting) those on a 
downward trajectory.  Thus, we expect PriorXRet for buys to be significantly larger than for sells 
for the momentum traders.  This is precisely what we find, over all markets (t = 24.05) and in each 
of the separate market categories.  Indeed, for the trades in the U.S. and emerging market 
exchanges, buys follow large market-adjusted price run-ups (e.g., PriorXRet = 2.33% for the U.S. 
trades) and sells follow market-adjusted price declines (PriorXRet = -0.31% for U.S. trades). 
 Based on the results for mean pre-trade excess returns in the first three columns in Table 3 
it is evident that the value and momentum manages are conditioning their trades, either implicitly 
or explicitly, on prior share price movements.  To reinforce these inferences, I also estimate a logit 
model to accompany the t-tests in each of the separate rows in Table 3.  The dependent variable in 
the logit model is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the order i is a buy and zero if it 
is a sell.  The independent variable in the model is PriorXReti , the three-week market-adjusted 
price change for the stock prior to order i. The estimated coefficients of the model are reported in 
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the middle two columns of Table 3, and are reported in bold if they are significant at the 5% level.  
The results of the logit estimation are consistent with the t-tests of the difference in means.  For 
example, the significant slope coefficient of -0.0081 for the trades of the value institutions across 
all markets indicates that the higher the pre-trade market-adjusted price change, the more likely it 
is that a value manager’s trade will be a sell.  The significant slope coefficient of 0.0092 for the 
trades of the momentum traders across all markets indicates that the higher the pre-trade excess 
return, the more likely it is that a momentum trade will be a buy. 
 
6. The Price Impact of Momentum Trading 
The previous section demonstrates that the momentum trader’s raison d’être – chasing price trends 
– distinguishes the behavior of momentum traders from the diversified and value traders.  That 
their motivation for trade is indelibly linked to the trajectory of the market has two effects on the 
relative costs of momentum versus other types of trading.  First, the momentum trader is typically 
chasing short-term price movements, so she demands a great deal of immediacy when trading – 
she wants the trade executed now.  Previous research has shown that increased demand for 
immediacy (e.g., using more aggressive market orders than more passive limit orders) results in 
higher trade costs (Keim and Madhavan (1997)).  Second, she tends to buy in rising markets and 
sell in falling markets.  Whereas value traders, whose objective is to buy stocks that have been 
depressed to price levels at or below fundamentals, are effectively paddling with the current, 
momentum traders are paddling against the current.  It is this second effect – the market 
environment in which the trade takes place – that can result in large differences in the price impacts 
between the momentum traders and the others. 
Given that momentum traders condition their trades on prior price movements, this section 
examines price impacts of trades conditional on the direction of the local market in which the stock 
trades.  We predict buys in rising markets to be more expensive (have larger price impacts) than 
buys in falling markets.  This is because, information considerations aside, there is excess demand 
for the stock in rising markets due to a combination of (1) increased demand for liquidity on the 
momentum trader’s side of the market due to the existence of other like-minded traders, and/or (2) 
reduced supply of liquidity due to fewer sellers/owners of recently appreciated stocks who don’t 
wish to realize their capital gains.  Thus, buyers demanding immediacy in rising markets should 
expect to pay a larger price concession than in falling markets, where the buyer is effectively 
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supplying liquidity to the market.  Similar reasoning predicts that sells in falling markets will be 
more expensive (have larger price impacts) than sells in rising markets. 
 To this end, Table 4 reports mean price impacts separately for buys and sells for each of the 
three institutional classifications and for each of the three market categories, but also reports results 
separately for trades occurring in rising and falling markets.  A rising or falling market is 
determined by the three-week pre-trade return on the local stock market index being greater than 
zero or less than or equal to zero.  Panel A contains summary statistics related to buy transactions.  
The first column contains information for buys executed in a falling market and the second column 
for buy trades executed in a rising market.  Each triad contains the mean price impact (as defined 
in section 4.1) of the orders, the total value of the orders in billions of dollars, and the number of 
orders for that particular category of trade.  For example, the mean price impact for buys in a rising 
market, across all institutions and market categories, is 0.61% based on 161,707 orders valued at 
$273.0 billion.  The corresponding mean price impact for buys in a falling market is 0.48% (n = 
166,119; $293.5 billion) which is economically and statistically significantly lower than the price 
impact for buys in rising markets (difference = 0.13%, t = 10.30), consistent with the above 
prediction. 
 Although this pattern of buys being more expensive in rising than in falling markets holds 
uniformly across all institutions and market categories (the t-values in the third column reject a 
difference of zero in all cases), it is especially pronounced for the momentum traders.  Averaged 
across all markets, the difference in price impacts between rising and falling markets for the 
momentum traders is 0.20%; the average price impact for the buys executed in rising markets is 
0.84%.  In comparison, the difference in price impacts between rising and falling markets for the 
diversified and value managers is on the order of 0.10% (averaged over all markets); and the 
average price impact for buys in rising markets ranges from 0.47% to 0.55% for those traders. 
 A similar pattern emerges for the price impacts for the sell transactions in Panel B in Table 
4.  For example, the average price impact for sells in a falling market is 0.46%;9  in contrast, the 
mean price impact for sells in a rising market is 0.22% which is economically and statistically 
lower than the price impact for sells in falling markets (difference = 0.24%; t = -15.48).  This 
significant difference is consistent with our earlier prediction.  Analogous to the results for buys in 
Panel A, the pattern of sells being more expensive in falling than in rising markets holds 
                                                 
9 Recall that the price impacts for sells are multiplied by -1.0 so they can be interpreted as costs and, thereby, 
directly compared to impacts estimated for buys. 
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consistently across all institutions and markets.  Once again, the difference is large for the 
momentum managers.  Averaged over all markets, the difference in price impacts between falling 
and rising markets for the momentum traders is 0.19%; the average price impacts for sells executed 
in falling markets is 0.78%.  The corresponding difference for the diversified and value traders 
ranges from 0.16% to 0.34%.  These differences are not dramatically different from the momentum 
traders.  The reason is that even though the mean price impact for their sells in falling markets is 
half the magnitude of that for the momentum traders (ranging from 0.27% to 0.39%), their price 
impacts for selling in a rising market are only 10 – 20% of the magnitude of those costs for the 
momentum traders.  Indeed, in two instances the diversified and value traders have “negative 
costs” when selling in rising markets.  The “negative costs” associated with the sells in rising 
markets can be attributed to traders acting as liquidity suppliers.  Liquidity demanders pay a price 
concession for demanding immediacy, whereas liquidity suppliers (e.g., market makers) are paid to 
provide liquidity or transaction immediacy, thereby enjoying “negative” costs of transacting.  
Indeed, such negative price impacts are associated with the trades of the diversified and the value 
traders whose investment strategies do not require the degree of trade immediacy that is 
characteristic of a momentum strategy.  Diversified and value strategies permit a more patient 
approach to trading in which liquidity provision is possible. 
 
6.1  A Model of Price Impacts 
The average price impacts in table 4 do not control for differences in trade characteristics (that 
proxy for trade difficulty) that have been shown in previous research to affect trade costs.  Thus, in 
this section I estimate a model of price impacts that controls explicitly for trade difficulty (e.g., 
trade size, market liquidity) as well as market conditions (as captured by prior price movement of 
the stock being traded.)  The objective is to assess whether the estimated price impact function is 
significantly different in rising and falling markets, as might be expected given the results 
presented above on mean price impacts.  Specifically, I estimate a variant of the model used by 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) in their analysis of total trade costs.  For buy transactions I estimate: 
 
PIi = β0 + β1 TradeSizei + β2 (1/Pi) + β3 ln(Mcapi) +  δ0 DiB + δ1 TradeSizei *DiB+  δ2 (1/Pi)* DiB  
        + δ3 ln(Mcapi)* DiB 
 
where PIi is the price impact for order i, TradeSizei is the number of shares traded in order i as a 
percent of the total shares outstanding, Pi is the price of the stock in order i,  Mcapi is the market 
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capitalization of the stock traded in order i  in billions of dollars, DiB  equals one if RM ≤ 0, zero 
otherwise, and RM is the three-week pre-trade return on the local stock market index.  Larger orders 
should result in higher costs, so β1 is expected to be positive.  The proportional bid-ask spread 
decreases with price so that β2 is expected to be greater than zero.  Market capitalization of the 
stock being traded is included as a proxy for liquidity, so that β3 is expected to be less than zero.   
 Note that for buys, the coefficients β0 to β3 measure the price impact function in rising 
markets.  The coefficients δ0 to δ3 measure the difference in the marginal effect of the independent 
variables on price impact (or on the level of the intercept) between falling and rising markets.  A 
negative value for δ1, for example, indicates that the estimated relation (slope) between price 
impact and trade size is lower in falling markets than in rising markets.  To maintain symmetry in 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients for buys and sells, when estimating the model for sells 
the value of DiS equals one if RM > 0, and zero otherwise.  Therefore, for sells the coefficients β0 to 
β3 measure the price impact function in falling markets; and the coefficients δ0 to δ3 measure the 
difference in the marginal effects of the independent variables (or in the level of the intercept) 
between rising and falling markets.  Thus, in both models the estimated coefficients on the non-
dummied variables measure the impact function for trades made in the same direction as the local 
market movement (i.e., buys in rising markets and sells in falling markets). 
 Turn first to the models estimated for buys in Panel A in Table 5.  The estimated 
coefficients are generally significant and have the expected signs: price impacts are increasing in 
trade size, decreasing with increasing market liquidity (as proxied by market cap), and increasing 
with the proportional bid-ask spread (as proxied by price inverse).  Comparing across trade styles, 
the estimated intercepts (the unconditional base-level price impact) are clearly larger for trades by 
momentum traders than for diversified and value traders.  And controlling for bid-ask spread and 
market liquidity effects, the relation between price impact and trade size for momentum trades 
ranges from three to four times the magnitude for trades by the other institutions. 
 The estimated coefficients on the interacted variables for buy trades are less clear regarding 
differences in price impacts between rising and falling markets.  The estimates reveal several 
interesting patterns.  First, the estimates of δ0 for the different trade styles are all negative and 
significant, indicating that the intercepts estimated in falling markets are smaller than those in 
rising markets.  The estimates for δ1 indicate that the influence of trade size on price impact is 
significantly dampened in falling markets for value traders.  However, the significant positive 
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coefficient for the buys of momentum traders indicate a steeper slope for the price impact–trade 
size relation in falling than in rising markets (contrary to expectations).  Finally, the estimates of δ2 
and δ3 are insignificant in most cases, suggesting there is not much difference in the effects of 
proportional bid-ask spread and market cap on the price impacts of buy trades between rising and 
falling markets. 
 The models estimated for the sell transactions reveal a more unified picture to that 
described above for the buys.  Briefly, the coefficient estimates are generally of the expected sign 
and are significant.  Both the estimated intercepts and the estimated relation between price impact 
and trade size are (1) significantly larger in falling markets than in rising markets, and (2) much 
larger for the momentum trades than for the trades of the diversified and value institutions. 
 The results in Table 5 show for both buys and, especially, sells that momentum trading 
exacerbates the adverse effects on price impacts associated with trade size and, thereby, 
significantly magnifies its effect on total trade cost.  Figure 1 presents a visual representation of 
this relation between predicted price impact and trade size separately for the three institutional 
types, and illustrates how the relation differs in rising and falling markets.  The price impact 
functions are shown separately for buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B); and note that, unlike the 
results in Table 5, the price impact functions for sells are not multiplied by negative one.  The 
figure plots the estimated relation over the range of trade size in our sample, and uses values for 
market cap of $1 billion and share price of $15 U.S.10  The plots clearly illustrate several patterns 
in the price impacts.  First, the price impact functions are generally steeper with larger intercepts 
when trades are executed in the direction of the market (i.e., trend chasing). The main exception is 
the steeper slope for the impact function of the momentum buy trades in falling markets.  Although 
the slope of the price impact function for momentum buys is flatter in rising than in falling 
markets, the intercept in rising markets is much higher than in falling markets.  Indeed, this latter 
effect is large enough to offset the flatter slope in rising markets so that expected price impacts for 
momentum traders are higher in rising than in falling markets over a wide range of trade size 
(specifically, for all trades less than 0.6% of total shares outstanding for the traded stock.)  Second, 
across the entire range of trade size, the price impacts of the momentum traders are larger than the 
                                                 
10 Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2003) replicate the simulated strategies of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Hong, 
Lim and Stein (2000) and report that the winner and loser portfolios in those simulations are concentrated in small 
cap, low price stocks.  For example, the median market cap (share price) for the stocks in the decile of winners is 
$210.3 million ($19.36).  The corresponding median values for the stocks in the decile of losers are $55.4 million 
and $6.32.  These values motivate my choice of $1billion and $15 for the plots in Figure 1. 
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price impacts of the diversified and value traders in both rising and falling markets and for both 
buys and sells.  At the low end of the trade size spectrum, predicted one-way price impacts for 
momentum trades range from 0.5% to 1.0% for both buys and sells.  In the upper ranges of trade 
size predicted one-way price impacts reach levels of 1.9% to 2.5% for both buys and sells.  These 
results for price impacts cast doubt on the likelihood of successfully implementing momentum 
strategies, suggesting that committing institutional-scale assets to such strategies may be futile.11  
Before any final assessment, however, we have to examine total trading costs. 
 
7. Total Trade Costs and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies 
The evidence on price impacts in section 6 casts considerable doubt on the feasibility of 
momentum strategies.  The prospect of successfully implementing such strategies becomes even 
bleaker with the recognition that price impacts are only one component of the total costs of 
implementing an investment strategy.  Total trade costs include explicit costs and opportunity costs 
in addition to price impacts (see Keim and Madhavan (1998) for an overview).  Explicit costs 
include commissions, custodial fees and, in the context of trades outside domestic markets, stamp 
duties (transactions taxes levied on non-resident traders).  Opportunity costs reflect the inability to 
actually execute at the price prevailing when the decision to trade is made.  The idea is that the 
trader has (monopolistic) access to information regarding the future value of the stock, but the 
value of that information will decay over time as others traders acquire that information and make 
trades based on it.  Thus, the longer the lag between the decision to trade and the actual 
commencement of trading, the greater is the possibility of not capturing that value.  Opportunity 
costs are particularly relevant for momentum traders who attempt to buy (sell) a stock on an 
upward (downward) trajectory.  A lag between the decision to trade and the actual trade results in 
the possibility of missing part (or all) of the prospective price movement.  The longer the lag, the 
greater is the possible opportunity loss. 
Table 6 reports average total trade costs separately for the three investment styles, the three 
market categories, and buys and sells.  Total costs are decomposed into explicit and implicit costs.  
Explicit costs include commissions, custodial fees and stamp duties.  Following Keim and 
Madhavan (1997), implicit costs are defined as the ratio of the volume-weighted average trade 
price of the individual trades within an order to the closing stock price on the day before the 
                                                 
11 See also Korajczyk and Sadka (2002) who reach similar conclusions using a simulation approach to estimating 
price impacts. 
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decision to trade, minus 1.0, in excess of the market return over the interval of the order.  As such, 
the implicit cost measure incorporates both price impact and opportunity cost.  Several aspects of 
the average trade costs are worth pointing out.  First, implicit costs tend to be larger than explicit 
costs, especially for buys.  For the momentum traders, implicit costs are much larger than explicit 
costs for both buys and sells.  Second, explicit costs are smallest for trades executed in the U.S. 
markets (ranging from 0.107% to 0.190%) and are largest in emerging markets (0.438% to 
0.499%).  Finally, total trade costs (implicit plus explicit costs) are lowest for the value traders 
(0.77% for buys, 0.392% for sells, across all markets) and highest for momentum traders (1.307% 
for buys, 1.131% for sells, across all markets). 
The total trade costs reported in table 6 for momentum traders serve to amplify the previous 
discussion (in the context of price impacts) regarding the profitable implementation of momentum 
strategies.  The one-way total trade costs of 1.13 to 1.31% for the momentum traders in our sample 
are sufficient to offset the abnormal returns of simulated momentum strategies.  But remember that 
such unconditional costs represent lower bounds on the costs for momentum traders.  To help 
illustrate the potential magnitude of the conditional total trade costs for momentum traders, Figure 
2 plots the relation between predicted total trade costs and trade size for the three investment 
styles, separately in rising and falling markets and separately for buys and sells.  Figure 2 is the 
total trade cost analog to Figure 1, and is based on the same model described in section 6.1 with 
one exception: the dependent variable in the model is total trade cost as defined above (price 
impact plus opportunity cost plus commission).12  At the low end of the trade size range, predicted 
one-way total trade costs for momentum buys (sells) in rising (falling) markets is approximately 
1.9% (1.7%); in the upper range of trade size, these values are about 2.9% and 3.4%.  Referring to 
Table 1, the combination of 110% turnover implied in the Grinblatt-Moskowitz strategy and 
average one-way price impacts in the range of 1.7% to 3.4% yields an implied strategy profit that 
is deep in the net loss region of the matrix.  To turn a profit with such high trading costs would 
require levels of portfolio turnover that are lower than is typical for the simulated momentum 
strategies.  For example, with one-way costs of 1.90%, positive profits are possible only for 
                                                 
12 The estimated model coefficients for total trade costs display similar patterns across investment styles and across 
buy and sell trades as those reported in Table 5 for price impacts.  Indeed, there are no major exceptions to the 
description of the patterns and significance levels provided for the price impact coefficients in section 6.1.  The main 
difference, as expected, are larger estimated intercepts for the regressions estimated for total trade costs.  Estimation 
results for the total trade cost models are available on request. 
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turnover levels less than 60% per month.  Such high costs make successful implementation of 
simulated strategies unlikely. 
 
8.  Some (Modest) Evidence on the (Short-Term) Performance of Momentum Strategies 
So, a relevant question remains:  Are actual momentum strategies – as opposed to simulated 
strategies – profitable?  More specifically, do the strategies of the momentum funds in my sample 
generate returns that sufficiently offset their high trade costs, thereby resulting in positive profits?  
If so, it would be interesting to know more about the design of the strategies.  If not, how long does 
it take for the momentum funds to either (1) modify their investment and/or trading strategy in the 
attempt to become profitable, or (2) go out of business.  Unfortunately, I don’t know the identities 
of the funds, and have only a short window into their trading activities.  Thus, I can say little about 
either the performance or the longevity of the funds.  (Because of poor performance it is indeed 
possible that the funds don’t exist for very long after their appearance in the Plexus data.)  
Nevertheless, in this section I offer some insights into the answer by examining the short-term 
performance of the momentum traders in my sample for the two years of trades available.  In 
contrast to the simulated strategies that examine 3 to 12 month post-trade performance, the three 
weeks of post-trade share price data provided by Plexus permit only a short-term glimpse (a peek 
behind the curtain) of post-trade performance.13  
 My performance measure is simply the average (local) market-adjusted price change for 
the momentum traders for the three weeks after the trade (from the trade price to the closing price 
on day t+16).14   Based on this measure, the performance of the momentum traders is not good.  
The post-trade performance of the buys is uniformly flat – the excess three-week price changes are 
not significantly different from zero when averaged over all markets (0.052%) or if measured in 
each of the markets separately: 0.003% (U.S.); 0.107% (other developed markets); -0.144% 
(emerging markets).  And the post-trade excess price behavior of the sells is significantly positive 
(0.327%) when averaged over all markets.  Thus, although the momentum traders are indeed 
buying (selling) stocks that exhibit a rising (falling) trajectory, their presence in the market for 
                                                 
13 For the U.S. trades, the Plexus data could be merged with the CRSP daily stock price data to lengthen this post-
trade window.  For the non-U.S. trades, however, such a merge is not feasible because of the lack of readily 
available and reliable individual stock price data for most of the markets in the sample.  Therefore, to maintain 
consistency in the results for both the U.S. and other market, I report performance only for this three-week post-
trade period. 
14 There is no explicit risk adjustment to the price changes reported here.  Given the short post-trade time interval, 
formal risk adjustment would add little to the analysis. 
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these stocks merely serves to exacerbate that trajectory.  However, the post-trade price trajectory is 
either not in the desired direction or of an insignificant magnitude.  This is an admittedly short 
window of post-trade performance.  However, the picture that emerges contains no indication that 
the profitability of these trades would improve if the window were lengthened.  After all, these 
traders appear to be pursuing short-term price trends that simply fail to materialize in the short 
period following the trade.   
 
9. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to help clarify the claims of profitability of simulated momentum 
strategies by documenting the costs of implementing actual momentum strategies.  To properly 
gauge the profitability of momentum strategies requires the distinction between unconditional 
implementation costs and implementation costs that are conditioned on trading style and market 
conditions prevailing at the time of the trade.  I examine the trade behavior, and the costs of those 
trades, for three distinct investor styles (momentum, fundamental/value, and diversified/index) for 
33 institutional investment managers executing trades in the U.S. and 36 other equity markets 
worldwide in both developed and emerging economies.  The results show: (1) that momentum 
traders do indeed condition their trades on prior price movements; and (2) that costs for trades 
conditional on past price movements are significantly greater than unconditional costs, and this 
difference is amplified for momentum traders who typically demand more trade immediacy than 
other traders.  
 The evidence that we report on the costs of actual momentum-based trades indicates that 
the returns reported in previous studies of simulated momentum strategies are not sufficient to 
cover the costs of implementing those strategies.  This of course leaves the question of whether 
momentum traders in practice can generate returns that exceed actual implementation costs.  The 
data used here, unfortunately, are unable to adequately address the issue of performance of actual 
momentum managers.  The limited evidence we can offer reveals that the short-term (3-week) 
post-trade performance of the momentum managers in our sample is flat.  Nevertheless, the 
continued proliferation of momentum managers suggests an affirmative answer.  But this in turn 
raises another question: if their strategies are profitable, then exactly how do those strategies differ 
from the simulated strategies that appear to be unprofitable? 
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Appendix
        Trade Activity by Investment Style
       33 Institutional  Traders, reported separately for 37 International Stock Markets. 
(Averaged over April 1996 - March 1997 and January 2000 - December 2000 subperiods)
Local Market             Diversified                Value               Momentum
Country Index* # orders $ Billions # orders $ Billions # orders $ Billions
Developed Markets
United States S&P 500 43,882 38.3 51,584 114.9 57,893 85.3
Australia FW 7,610 6.3 4,135 6.3 3,759 7.6
Austria FW 766 0.6 232 0.2 124 0.1
Belgium FW 698 0.5 358 0.4 337 0.4
Canada FW 1,398 0.8 1,234 1.8 1,751 2.6
Denmark FW 1,269 1.5 666 1.1 647 1.0
Finland CI 1,663 5.1 1,258 4.0 2,030 6.4
France FW 14,147 29.0 9,918 20.9 9,279 25.8
Germany FW 11,864 22.8 7,278 20.7 6,798 15.4
Hong Kong FW 8,466 11.9 5,234 10.5 5,527 8.7
Ireland FW 1,014 0.7 433 0.9 1,036 1.1
Italy FW 6,040 11.1 3,204 9.0 4,689 12.1
Japan FW 54,813 77.4 33,505 52.2 18,409 44.6
Netherlands FW 7,594 16.4 4,989 15.7 6,190 14.1
New Zealand FW 944 0.7 716 0.9 180 0.1
Norway FW 1,167 0.6 694 1.1 508 0.5
Singapore FW 3,961 4.2 2,215 2.7 2,371 2.8
Spain FW 5,207 9.7 2,829 6.9 2,570 5.5
Sweden FW 3,553 7.9 2,150 6.0 3,863 8.6
Switzerland FW 4,478 13.4 2,934 8.7 3,027 10.6
United Kingdom FW 41,634 120.4 37,720 65.3 29,328 56.7
Emerging Markets
Argentina CI 196 0.1 124 0.2 201 0.0
Brazil CI 1,738 1.5 1,206 2.0 1,258 0.8
Czech Republic FW 755 0.5 281 0.3 263 0.1
Greece CI 513 0.4 391 0.4 458 0.3
India CI 787 0.9 568 1.3 1,240 0.8
Indonesia CI 472 0.3 331 0.5 256 0.1
Korea CI 2,701 2.6 1,190 6.1 2,013 3.1
Malaysia FW 5,147 3.7 2,654 1.6 2,417 1.8
Mexico FW 1,506 1.1 1,250 1.7 1,231 0.9
Philippines CI 924 0.4 423 0.5 280 0.1
Poland CI 654 0.3 214 0.2 429 0.2
Portugal CI 511 0.8 369 1.1 357 0.5
South Africa FW 2,612 1.9 1,623 2.0 1,534 0.7
Taiwan CI 1,945 2.1 925 4.5 1,841 2.4
Thailand CI 1,704 1.6 835 0.9 884 0.5
Turkey CI 668 0.6 645 0.5 459 0.2
Overall 245,001 398.3 186,315 373.9 175,437 322.7
Developed 222,168 379.5 173,286 350.3 160,316 310.2
Emerging 22,833 18.8 13,029 23.7 15,121 12.5
*CI indicates Morgan Stanley Capital International local market index; FW indicates FTSE World local market index
Table 1
The sensitivity of momentum profits to trade costs and portfolio turnover.
The table reports profits to momentum trading after adjustment for transaction costs. The values in the table are based on monthly momentum profits reported in Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2002) of 1.11% 
that are unadjusted for trading costs.  Each cell in the table is defined as monthly profit (i.e., 111 basis points) minus (monthly turnover in percent)*(trade costs in basis points).  Monthly turnover represents
roundtrip monthly turnover - for example, if during the month a portfolio manager sells 50% of the value of the positions in her portfolio, then her total trading volume during the month will be 100% of the 
value of her portfolio: 50% for the securities she sold and 50% for the assets bought to replace the sold positions.  Trade costs (at the top of the columns) are one-way costs.  Profits are in italics,
losses are in bold.  For example, the strategy reported in Grinblatt and Moskowitz reports an unadjusted monthly profit of 111 basis points and a monthly turnover of 103%.  If the trade costs associated
with that strategy were 1.0% on average, the strategy would yield an average monthly profit of 8 basis points.
Trade Costs (Price Impact + Commissions) in basis points
Monthly
Turnover 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220
30 99 98 96 95 93 92 90 89 87 86 84 83 81 80 78 77 75 74 72 71 69 68 66 65 63 62 60 59 57 56 54 53 51 50 48 47 45
35 97 95 94 92 90 88 87 85 83 81 80 78 76 74 73 71 69 67 66 64 62 60 59 57 55 53 52 50 48 46 45 43 41 39 38 36 34
40 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81 79 77 75 73 71 69 67 65 63 61 59 57 55 53 51 49 47 45 43 41 39 37 35 33 31 29 27 25 23
45 93 91 89 86 84 82 80 77 75 73 71 68 66 64 62 59 57 55 53 50 48 46 44 41 39 37 35 32 30 28 26 23 21 19 17 14 12
50 91 89 86 84 81 79 76 74 71 69 66 64 61 59 56 54 51 49 46 44 41 39 36 34 31 29 26 24 21 19 16 14 11 9 6 4 1
55 89 86 84 81 78 75 73 70 67 64 62 59 56 53 51 48 45 42 40 37 34 31 29 26 23 20 18 15 12 9 7 4 1 -2 -5 -7 -10
60 87 84 81 78 75 72 69 66 63 60 57 54 51 48 45 42 39 36 33 30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15 -18 -21
65 85 82 79 75 72 69 66 62 59 56 53 49 46 43 40 36 33 30 27 23 20 17 14 10 7 4 1 -3 -6 -9 -13 -16 -19 -22 -26 -29 -32
70 83 80 76 73 69 66 62 59 55 52 48 45 41 38 34 31 27 24 20 17 13 10 6 3 -1 -5 -8 -12 -15 -19 -22 -26 -29 -33 -36 -40 -43
75 81 77 74 70 66 62 59 55 51 47 44 40 36 32 29 25 21 17 14 10 6 2 -2 -5 -9 -13 -17 -20 -24 -28 -32 -35 -39 -43 -47 -50 -54
80 79 75 71 67 63 59 55 51 47 43 39 35 31 27 23 19 15 11 7 3 -1 -5 -9 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -37 -41 -45 -49 -53 -57 -61 -65
85 77 73 69 64 60 56 52 47 43 39 35 30 26 22 18 13 9 5 1 -4 -8 -12 -17 -21 -25 -29 -34 -38 -42 -46 -51 -55 -59 -63 -68 -72 -76
90 75 71 66 62 57 53 48 44 39 35 30 26 21 17 12 8 3 -2 -6 -11 -15 -20 -24 -29 -33 -38 -42 -47 -51 -56 -60 -65 -69 -74 -78 -83 -87
95 73 68 64 59 54 49 45 40 35 30 26 21 16 11 6 2 -3 -8 -13 -17 -22 -27 -32 -36 -41 -46 -51 -55 -60 -65 -70 -74 -79 -84 -89 -93 -98
103 70 65 60 54 49 44 39 34 29 23 18 13 8 3 -2 -7 -13 -18 -23 -28 -33 -38 -44 -49 -54 -59 -64 -69 -74 -80 -85 -90 -95 -100 -105 -110 -116
105 69 64 59 53 48 43 38 32 27 22 17 11 6 1 -5 -10 -15 -20 -26 -31 -36 -41 -47 -52 -57 -62 -68 -73 -78 -83 -89 -94 -99 -104 -110 -115 -120
110 67 62 56 51 45 40 34 29 23 18 12 7 1 -5 -10 -16 -21 -27 -32 -38 -43 -49 -54 -60 -65 -71 -76 -82 -87 -93 -98 -104 -109 -115 -120 -126 -131
115 65 59 54 48 42 36 31 25 19 13 8 2 -4 -10 -16 -21 -27 -33 -39 -44 -50 -56 -62 -67 -73 -79 -85 -90 -96 -102 -108 -113 -119 -125 -131 -136 -142
120 63 57 51 45 39 33 27 21 15 9 3 -3 -9 -15 -21 -27 -33 -39 -45 -51 -57 -63 -69 -75 -81 -87 -93 -99 -105 -111 -117 -123 -129 -135 -141 -147 -153
125 61 55 49 42 36 30 24 17 11 5 -2 -8 -14 -20 -27 -33 -39 -45 -52 -58 -64 -70 -77 -83 -89 -95 -102 -108 -114 -120 -127 -133 -139 -145 -152 -158 -164
130 59 53 46 40 33 27 20 14 7 1 -6 -13 -19 -26 -32 -39 -45 -52 -58 -65 -71 -78 -84 -91 -97 -104 -110 -117 -123 -130 -136 -143 -149 -156 -162 -169 -175
135 57 50 44 37 30 23 17 10 3 -4 -11 -17 -24 -31 -38 -44 -51 -58 -65 -71 -78 -85 -92 -98 -105 -112 -119 -125 -132 -139 -146 -152 -159 -166 -173 -179 -186
140 55 48 41 34 27 20 13 6 -1 -8 -15 -22 -29 -36 -43 -50 -57 -64 -71 -78 -85 -92 -99 -106 -113 -120 -127 -134 -141 -148 -155 -162 -169 -176 -183 -190 -197
145 53 46 39 31 24 17 10 2 -5 -12 -20 -27 -34 -41 -49 -56 -63 -70 -78 -85 -92 -99 -107 -114 -121 -128 -136 -143 -150 -157 -165 -172 -179 -186 -194 -201 -208
150 51 44 36 29 21 14 6 -2 -9 -17 -24 -32 -39 -47 -54 -62 -69 -77 -84 -92 -99 -107 -114 -122 -129 -137 -144 -152 -159 -167 -174 -182 -189 -197 -204 -212 -219
155 49 41 34 26 18 10 3 -5 -13 -21 -29 -36 -44 -52 -60 -67 -75 -83 -91 -98 -106 -114 -122 -129 -137 -145 -153 -160 -168 -176 -184 -191 -199 -207 -215 -222 -230
160 47 39 31 23 15 7 -1 -9 -17 -25 -33 -41 -49 -57 -65 -73 -81 -89 -97 -105 -113 -121 -129 -137 -145 -153 -161 -169 -177 -185 -193 -201 -209 -217 -225 -233 -241
165 45 37 29 20 12 4 -4 -13 -21 -29 -38 -46 -54 -62 -71 -79 -87 -95 -104 -112 -120 -128 -137 -145 -153 -161 -170 -178 -186 -194 -203 -211 -219 -227 -236 -244 -252
170 43 35 26 18 9 1 -8 -17 -25 -34 -42 -51 -59 -68 -76 -85 -93 -102 -110 -119 -127 -136 -144 -153 -161 -170 -178 -187 -195 -204 -212 -221 -229 -238 -246 -255 -263
175 41 32 24 15 6 -3 -12 -20 -29 -38 -47 -55 -64 -73 -82 -90 -99 -108 -117 -125 -134 -143 -152 -160 -169 -178 -187 -195 -204 -213 -222 -230 -239 -248 -257 -265 -274
180 39 30 21 12 3 -6 -15 -24 -33 -42 -51 -60 -69 -78 -87 -96 -105 -114 -123 -132 -141 -150 -159 -168 -177 -186 -195 -204 -213 -222 -231 -240 -249 -258 -267 -276 -285
185 37 28 19 9 0 -9 -19 -28 -37 -46 -56 -65 -74 -83 -93 -102 -111 -120 -130 -139 -148 -157 -167 -176 -185 -194 -204 -213 -222 -231 -241 -250 -259 -268 -278 -287 -296
190 35 26 16 6 -3 -13 -22 -32 -41 -51 -60 -70 -79 -89 -98 -108 -117 -127 -136 -146 -155 -165 -174 -184 -193 -203 -212 -222 -231 -241 -250 -260 -269 -279 -288 -298 -307
195 33 23 14 4 -6 -16 -26 -35 -45 -55 -65 -74 -84 -94 -104 -113 -123 -133 -143 -152 -162 -172 -182 -191 -201 -211 -221 -230 -240 -250 -260 -269 -279 -289 -299 -308 -318
200 31 21 11 1 -9 -19 -29 -39 -49 -59 -69 -79 -89 -99 -109 -119 -129 -139 -149 -159 -169 -179 -189 -199 -209 -219 -229 -239 -249 -259 -269 -279 -289 -299 -309 -319 -329
Table 2
Average Price Impacts (%) and Other Characteristics for Institutional Equity Trades
Average price impacts are based on trades in 37 international stock markets and are reported separately for: three investment styles; U.S., other developed, and emerging markets; 
and buy and sell trades.  Price impact is the ratio of the average trade price of the individual trades within an order to the closing stock price on the day before the order was
initiated, minus 1.0, in excess of the market return over the interval of the order.  Price impacts for sells are multiplied by negative one so they can be interpreted as costs and easily
compared to impacts for buys. Results are shown separately for the periods April 1996 - March 1997 (for 26 institutions) and January 2000 - December 2000 (for 33 institutions).
Diversified Institutions Value Institutions Momentum Institutions
         1996-1997 2000          1996-1997 2000          1996-1997 2000
Buys Sells Buys Sells Buys Sells Buys Sells Buys Sells Buys Sells
A. U.S. Equity Markets
Mean Price Impact 0.077 0.787 0.468 0.391 0.006 0.303 0.482 0.336 1.134 1.291 0.810 0.746
(Standard Error) (0.056) (0.078) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.041) (0.042) (0.029) (0.035) (0.045) (0.060)
# obs 3,387 2,686 21,259 16,552 10,269 11,339 15,267 14,719 23,099 19,200 9,022 6,578
B. Developed Markets (not U.S.)
Mean Price Impact 0.358 0.144 0.647 0.198 0.284 0.161 0.538 0.130 0.406 0.169 0.615 0.499
(Standard Error) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.018) (0.021)
# obs 49,060 26,637 48,810 53,783 32,396 23,340 29,709 36,259 10,087 7,456 48,137 36,770
C. Emerging Equity Markets
Mean Price Impact 0.515 0.222 0.773 0.217 0.551 0.284 1.151 0.058 0.910 0.014 0.624 0.682
(Standard Error) (0.041) (0.071) (0.081) (0.071) (0.064) (0.080) (0.100) (0.083) (0.115) (0.116) (0.055) (0.062)
# obs 7,702 3,756 4,836 6,541 2,976 1,653 3,843 4,557 1,809 1,770 6,199 5,349
D. All Markets
Mean Price Impact 0.362 0.206 0.604 0.241 0.239 0.211 0.569 0.179 0.912 0.917 0.643 0.553
(Standard Error) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019)
# obs 60,149 33,079 74,905 76,876 45,641 36,332 48,819 55,535 34,995 28,426 63,358 48,697
mktcap ($bill) 7.882 8.145 33.704 28.951 10.783 11.730 30.264 24.475 6.417 5.440 26.470 27.331
trsize (% of Shr Outst) 0.043 0.073 0.050 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.093 0.082 0.129 0.155 0.043 0.053
$ Value of Trades ($ bill) 50.20 34.34 160.20 153.63 41.39 35.33 147.99 149.23 38.63 37.24 128.12 118.87
           Table 3
               Are Institutional Investors' Trades Conditioned on Prior Price Movements? 
The table reports average 3-week excess returns prior to institutional trade packages and estimates of a logistic regression model for 
these buy and sell packages.  The average excess returns are measured over the 15 trading days prior to the commencement of a trade.
The 3-week pre-trade excess return for security i , PriorXRet i , is defined as the return for security i  for the 15 trading days preceding 
the trade minus the return (for the same period) for the market in which the stock is traded.  The dependent variable in the logit model 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the package is a buy, and 0 otherwise.  PriorXRet i  is the independent variable in the model.
Maximum liklihood estimates of the model are reported, with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.  Results are reported for the
33 institutions in the U.S. and 36 other international equity markets for the pooled 96-97 and 2000 sample periods.
Mean 3-week excess price change (%)             Logit Model
  (PriorXRet ) prior to:    Coefficient Estimates  Frequency Counts for 
 Buys Sells t(Buys-Sells) intercept PriorXRet Buys Sells
  
Overall 0.833 0.658 6.21 -0.1607 0.0015 327,615 278,677
(0.0025) (0.0002)
A. Diversified Institutions
All Markets 0.662 0.721 -1.42 -0.2062 -0.0006 134,992 109,884
(0.0041) (0.0004)
U.S. 0.474 0.313 1.29 -0.2478 0.0010 24,635 19,221
  (0.0096) (0.0007)
Other Developed 0.713 0.867 -3.37 -0.1978 -0.0017 97,822 80,372
(0.0048) (0.0005)
Emerging 0.631 0.347 2.20 -0.1958 0.0030 12,535 10,291
(0.0132) (0.0014)
B. Value Institutions
All Markets 0.170 0.941 -17.00 -0.0328 -0.0081 94,412 91,776
(0.0046) (0.0005)
U.S. -0.305 0.783 -10.99 0.0176 -0.0087 25,507 26,013
(0.0088) (0.0008)
Other Developed 0.302 1.059 -14.49 -0.0478 -0.0092 62,087 59,558
(0.0058) (0.0006)
Emerging 0.751 0.471 1.67 -0.0923 0.0031 6,818 6,205
(0.0176) (0.0018)
C. Momentum Institutions
All Markets 1.741 0.232 24.05 -0.2342 0.0092 98,211 77,017
(0.0048) (0.0004)
U.S. 2.334 -0.306 23.89 -0.2045 0.0154 32,083 25,753
(0.0084) (0.0007)
Other Developed 1.434 0.629 10.06 -0.2698 0.0050 58,125 44,152
(0.0063) (0.0005)
Emerging 1.146 -0.287 8.06 -0.1129 0.0122 8,003 7,112
(0.0163) (0.0015)
Bold indicates significance at the 5% level.
           Table 4
                Trend Chasing, Investment Flows, and Price Impacts 
Agregate investment flows and average price impacts conditioned on pre-trade local market return being greater
than zero or less than or equal to zero.  Market return (RM ) is the three-week pre-trade local market return. Price 
impact is the ratio of the average trade price to the closing stock price on the day before the order was initiated,
minus 1.0, in excess of the market return over the interval of the trade.  Price impacts for sells are multiplied by
negative one so that they can be interpreted as costs and easily compared to the impacts for buys.  T-values 
of the difference in average impact in upward- and downward-trending markets is to the right of these values.
Agregate investment flow is the sum of the dollar value of all trades in the respective category, reported in 
billions of dollars.  Number of orders is in parentheses. Results are reported for the 1996-97 and 2000 periods.
A.  Buys B.  Sells
(A)   (B)    (C)    (D)    
 R M  ≤ 0 R M >  0 t (B-A) R M  ≤ 0 R M >  0 t (D-C)
 
Overall 0.478 0.613 10.30 0.457 0.220 -15.48
$293.49 $272.95 $280.58 $247.83
(166,119) (161,707) (143,928) (134,970)
Diversified Institutions
All Markets 0.448 0.548 5.13 0.390 0.048 -14.13
$105.95 $104.43 $98.10 $89.77
(69,384) (65,662) (58,261) (51,683)
U.S. 0.360 0.486 2.92 0.570 0.303 -4.91
  $11.47 $8.88 $10.02 $7.97
(13,991) (10,654) (10,374) (8,863)
Other Developed 0.454 0.551 4.32 0.351 -0.012 -13.32
$89.99 $90.64 $83.72 $76.65
(49,195) (48,668) (42,318) (38,094)
Emerging 0.597 0.631 0.42 0.353 0.061 -2.80
$4.49 $4.91 $4.36 $5.05
(6,198) (6,340) (5,569) (4,726)
Value Institutions
All Markets 0.353 0.467 4.70 0.269 0.110 -6.24
$103.05 $86.31 $98.05 $86.50
(47,191) (47,262) (46,285) (45,570)
U.S. 0.212 0.373 3.01 0.364 0.279 -1.66
$33.18 $23.90 $31.91 $25.94
(12,867) (12,665) (13,130) (12,921)
Other Developed 0.350 0.460 4.21 0.234 0.047 -6.34
$63.82 $56.07 $59.76 $55.67
(30,773) (31,329) (29,730) (29,864)
Emerging 0.885 0.893 0.06 0.215 -0.001 -1.64
$6.05 $6.34 $6.39 $4.89
(3,551) (3,268) (3,425) (2,785)
Momentum Institutions
All Markets 0.639 0.842 7.94 0.778 0.589 -6.13
$84.50 $82.21 $84.43 $71.56
(49,544) (48,783) (39,382) (37,717)
U.S. 0.864 1.208 7.06 1.368 0.975 -6.55
$20.51 $23.76 $18.97 $22.06
(15,234) (16,881) (11,509) (14,263)
Other Developed 0.528 0.632 3.35 0.496 0.376 -3.25
$60.78 $55.38 $62.07 $46.61
(30,153) (28,054) (24,222) (19,989)
Emerging 0.614 0.769 1.57 0.789 0.227 -5.10
$3.20 $3.07 $3.39 $2.89
(4,157) (3,848) (3,651) (3,465)
Table 5
    Regression model of Price Impacts for Trades of 33 Institutions in the U.S. and 36 other International Equity Markets
The table contains results for the following models estimated separately for buys and sells:
Buys:   PI i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
B  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
B +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
B  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
B
Sells:   PI i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
S  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
S +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
S  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
S
where: PI i  is the price impact for order i;  TradeSize i  is the number of shares traded in order i  as a percent of the total shares outstanding; P i  is the price of the
stock in order i;   Mcap i  is the market capitalization of the stock traded in order i   in billions of dollars; D i
B   equals one if R M  ≤ 0, zero otherwise; D i
S  equals one if 
R M  > 0, zero otherwise; and R M  is the three-week pre-trade return on the local stock market index.  The β coefficients measure the price impact function for buys (sells) in
rising (falling) markets.  The δ coefficients measure the difference in the estimates of the price impact function between rising and falling markets.  Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates.  The models are estimated over the pooled 96-97 and 2000 sample periods.  Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5% level.
β0 β1 β2 β3 δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 Adj R2 # Obs
A. Buys
All Styles 0.7707 0.3485 0.0855 -0.1307 -0.1455 0.0249 -0.0125 0.0160 0.017 327,853
(0.0126) (0.0175) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0181) (0.0307) (0.0049) (0.0074)
Diversified 0.6764 0.2931 0.0035 -0.0870 -0.0655 0.0201 -0.0024 -0.0179 0.004 135,047
(0.0197) (0.0287) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0274) (0.0491) (0.0094) (0.0111)
Value 0.5890 0.1591 0.1335 -0.1017 -0.0929 -0.1408 -0.0149 -0.0075 0.018 94,457
(0.0247) (0.0274) (0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0352) (0.0475) (0.0073) (0.0144)
Momentum 0.9906 0.7191 0.0813 -0.1796 -0.2657 0.4463 0.0005 0.0644 0.021 98,347
(0.0224) (0.0365) (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0332) (0.0675) (0.0095) (0.0136)
B. Sells
All Styles 0.6811 0.5115 -0.0737 -0.1421 -0.2778 -0.1259 -0.0047 0.0169 0.011 278,934
(0.0145) (0.0246) (0.0030) (0.0059) (0.0208) (0.0306) (0.0050) (0.0084)
Diversified 0.6238 0.1220 -0.0425 -0.1347 -0.4082 -0.1398 -0.0325 0.0476 0.007 109,951
(0.0228) (0.0376) (0.0044) (0.0091) (0.0333) (0.0584) (0.0074) (0.0132)
Value 0.4257 0.3589 -0.0894 -0.0877 -0.0706 -0.2131 0.0068 -0.0545 0.010 91,864
(0.0258) (0.0418) (0.0047) (0.0105) (0.0363) (0.0527) (0.0078) (0.0148)
Momentum 0.9840 1.2716 -0.1172 -0.1817 -0.3467 -0.1313 0.0539 0.0644 0.027 77,117
(0.0286) (0.0502) (0.0082) (0.0113) (0.0394) (0.0638) (0.0126) (0.0160)
           Table 6
        Average Total Trade Costs (%) for Institutional Equity Trades 
Average total trade costs are reported separately for: three investment styles; U.S., other developed, and 
emerging markets; and buy and sell trades.  Implicit cost is the ratio of the average trade price of the individual
trades within an order to the closing stock price on the day before the decision to trade, minus 1.0, in excess
of the market return over the interval of the order.  Implicit costs for sells are multiplied by negative one so they
can be interpreted as costs and easily compared to impacts for buys.  Explicit costs include commissions,
custodial fees, and stamp duties for international trades. Results are reported for 33 institutions in the U.S. and
36 other international equity markets for the pooled 96-97 and 2000 sample periods
        A.  Buy Trade Costs           B.  Sell Trade Costs
 Implicit Explicit # Obs Implicit Explicit # Obs
 
Diversified Institutions
All Markets 0.561 0.284 135,054 0.256 0.232 109,955
U.S. 0.377 0.107 24,646 0.432 0.128 19,238
Other Developed 0.580 0.300 97,870 0.205 0.225 80,420
Emerging 0.772 0.499 12,538 0.327 0.481 10,297
Value Institutions
All Markets 0.483 0.296 94,460 0.176 0.216 91,867
U.S. 0.328 0.139 25,536 0.248 0.141 26,058
Other Developed 0.480 0.344 62,105 0.135 0.225 59,599
Emerging 1.079 0.442 6,819 0.258 0.443 6,210
Momentum Institutions
All Markets 1.011 0.296 98,353 0.900 0.231 77,123
U.S. 1.270 0.190 32,121 1.333 0.191 25,778
Other Developed 0.855 0.334 58,224 0.620 0.217 44,226
Emerging 1.101 0.438 8,008 1.066 0.468 7,119
Figure 1. Estimated Price Impact  Functions
The figure is based on the following models estimated separately for buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B):
Buys:   PI i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
B  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
B +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
B  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
B
Sells:   PI i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
S  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
S +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
S  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
S
where: PI i  is the price impact for order i;  TradeSize i  is the number of shares traded in order i  as a percent of the total shares outstanding; P i  is the price of 
the stock in order i;   Mcap i  is the market capitalization of the stock traded in order i   in billions of dollars; D i
B   equals one if R M  ≤ 0 for the stock in buy 
order i , zero otherwise; and D i
S  equals one if R M  > 0, zero otherwise.  The models are estimated over the pooled 96-97 and 2000 sample periods.
A. Price Impacts for Buys as a Function of Trade Size
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B. Price Impacts for Sells as a Function of Trade Size
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Figure 2. Estimated Total Trade Cost  Functions
The figure is based on the following models estimated separately for buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B):
Buys:   TotTrCost i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
B  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
B +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
B  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
B
Sells:   TotTrCost i = β 0  + β 1  TradeSize i  + β 2  (1/P i ) + β 3  ln(Mcap i ) +  δ 0  D i
S  + δ 1  TradeSize i  *D i
S +  δ 2  (1/P i )* D i
S  + δ 3  ln(Mcap i )* D i
S
where: TotTrCosti  is the total trade cost for order i;  TradeSize i  is the number of shares traded in order i  as a percent of the total shares outstanding; P i  is the
price of the stock in order i;   Mcap i  is the market capitalization of the stock traded in order i   in billions of dollars; D i
B   equals one if R M  ≤ 0 for the stock in
buy order i , zero otherwise; and D i
S  equals one if R M  > 0, zero otherwise.  The models are estimated over the pooled 96-97 and 2000 sample periods.
A. Total Trade Costs for Buys as a Function of Trade Size
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B. Total Trade Costs for Sells as a Function of Trade Size
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